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TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA, LUIS M. LINDE,
BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET COMMITTEE IN CONNECTION WITH THE DRAFT 
STATE BUDGET FOR 2013 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
The appearance by the Governor of the Banco de España before this Committee at the 
start of the annual debate on the State Budget is a tradition I am most pleased to embrace. 
I shall try to be as clear and direct as possible on those issues I consider most important. 
The Draft State Budget Law for 2013 is being presented against a background of singular 
difficulty for the Spanish economy. 
I intend, first, to discuss the international economic context, in particular in the euro 
area; second, to look at recent developments in the Spanish economy, with particular 
reference to competitiveness and fiscal consolidation; and finally, to analyse the key 
features of the draft Law. 
Without overstaying my welcome, I shall, before ending my address, briefly discuss the 
clean-up and restructuring programme for our banking system which, as you know, took 
a significant step forward on 28 September with the publication of the evaluations of the 
whole of the Spanish banking system. If you wish, we can go into greater detail on this 
matter in the round of questions, given its importance for restoring confidence in our 
economy, in activity and in employment, and, in short, for the implementation of the 
Budget for 2013. 
The international context is a primary factor of difficulty. The latest analyses and projec-
tions show signs of weakness, which can be explained to some extent by the difficulties 
the European economies are facing in overcoming a sovereign debt crisis that has now 
lasted for more than two years. While the growth forecast for the world economy as a 
whole in 2012 stood at around 4% a year back, this has now dipped to around 3%. The 
forecast for the United States has improved, but that for the euro area as a whole has 
fallen from growth of 1.1% a year ago to a decline of 0.4%. And the growth forecast for the 
emerging economies has edged down from above 6% to around 5%. 
The forecasts for 2013 have also been lowered, especially for the euro area as a whole. 
The sluggishness of the international economy and, in particular, of the euro area is bear-
ing down on our ability to recover. 
I would therefore find it useful to start with a comment on euro area governance and its 
problems. 
In my appearance before the Economic Affairs Committee last July, I addressed the source 
of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the main reasons for its depth and development. 
I believe I should reiterate that, to overcome the crisis, a new version of Monetary Union 
governance will be needed. 
There have so far been two different stages in the reform of European governance. In the 
first, efforts focused on remedying the shortcomings detected in macroeconomic and fi-
nancial policy oversight and coordination, and on the creation of financial assistance 
mechanisms. In the second stage, following the June 2012 Summit of euro area Heads of 
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State or Government, a banking union, greater fiscal integration and a common economic 
policy framework were proposed. 
Here you may recall that the European Commission communicated its plans for the bank-
ing union to the Parliament and the Council on 12 September, with a legislative proposal 
to give form to the first of the three pillars which would underpin such a union: a common 
supervisory mechanism for which ultimate responsibility would be centralised at the Euro-
pean Central Bank, while there would be scope for some degree of decentralisation, ena-
bling the knowledge and experience of national supervisors to be harnessed. 
The move is just a preliminary one and should be viewed with caution, since in order to 
complete the banking union an integrated bank crisis management mechanism and a com-
mon deposit guarantee scheme will be needed. This will not be possible without progress 
towards a fiscal union, an area that obviously poses most significant political difficulties. 
Along these same lines, I believe we should welcome the European Central Bank Govern-
ing Council’s decision on 2 August to set in train the so-called Outright Monetary Trans-
actions. This comprises a programme to purchase public debt on secondary markets, 
subject to compliance with specific conditions, as part of the financial support pro-
grammes of the European Financial Stability Facility and its successor, the European 
Stability Mechanism. 
Since the start of this crisis the ECB has adopted a series of conventional (short- and 
medium-term liquidity provision, changes in the deposit rate) and non-conventional meas-
ures (long-term liquidity provision, debt purchases) aimed at preserving the sound func-
tioning of monetary policy, which is tantamount to saying the transmission of the policy 
rates the ECB wishes to maintain at all maturities. These measures have also been useful 
in buying time for governments to correct the macroeconomic imbalances and the short-
comings in the institutional design of the euro which are, in part, at the source of the cur-
rent fragility. The Outright Monetary Transactions are a further example of this type of 
non-conventional measure. 
The new initiative is aimed at making sovereign debt markets work normally again, as their 
yields bear indirectly, but significantly, on households’ and firms’ financing costs. The aim 
is fully compatible with the ECB’s mandate, as the President of this institution has stressed 
on various occasions. 
Evidently, the announcement of this programme has had a stabilising effect. But given the 
nature of the problems at the source and in the development of this sovereign debt crisis 
the role that any ECB decision may play in resolving it can hardly go beyond mitigating the 
risks of serious accidents and of providing more time so that the decisions that must be 
taken in areas other than the ECB may come to fruition. 
Let me now turn to the key features of our current economic situation. 
The Spanish economy has been greatly affected by the financial tensions in the euro area, 
which emerged with the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2007-2008, and the 
public finances problems of several euro area members, beginning with Greece. In our 
case, the crisis reached us and, in turn, we contributed to its unfolding as a result of the 
doubts over the sustainability of our public finances, our poor growth expectations and the 
scale of our foreign debt, which essentially built up during the real estate boom. 
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Economic policy has striven to overcome various factors of vulnerability in a very adverse 
macroeconomic setting. The results of the reforms undertaken are still incipient, and we must 
persevere with this strategy, which is the only realistic way of resuming sustained growth. 
As recent events in Europe show, there are feedback loops from public finances and their 
problems to the banking system and its problems, and from the latter to activity and em-
ployment. In turn, job creation and growth are essential ingredients for progress on fiscal 
consolidation. Accordingly, economic policy-making should continue to be structured 
around two main goals: promoting competitiveness and growth, and restoring the sustain-
ability of public finances. I shall briefly refer to these two major issues before analysing the 
Budget for 2013. 
First, let us look at developments in employment and competitiveness, two closely inter-
connected problems. 
In terms of economy-wide unit labour costs, the cumulative loss to 2008 in respect of the 
1998 level stood at 18%. In industry, and measuring competitiveness always in terms of 
unit labour costs, it was almost 30%. Naturally, labour costs are not the only explanation 
for the increase in unemployment, but they have undoubtedly been a major factor. That 
there were serious failings in the regulation of our labour market is something that practi-
cally all international economic organisations have been pointing out for years. The reform 
of our labour legislation was unavoidable. 
The changes made are essentially geared to increasing the flexibility of our labour market: 
the priority of firm-level agreements, limits on the so-called “ultra-activity” of agreements, 
new regulations governing dismissal for objective reasons and greater facilities for main-
taining wage restraint at companies in difficulty are all elements of change aimed at pre-
venting dismissals and higher unemployment from being the only option for many compa-
nies to stay in business. 
The macroeconomic projections accompanying the Budget for 2013 include the stabilising 
of our unemployment rate at around 25% of the labour force, a rate double the average for 
the European Union countries. This rate of unemployment is, quite simply, dramatic. Hence 
the enormous importance of economic recovery and of greater labour market flexibility: 
these two variables complement one another, and without both operating simultaneously, 
net job creation will not be possible. 
I shall now move on to public finances and to the nature of the fiscal drive needed. 
In 2007 Spain posted a budget surplus of close to 2% of GDP and a public debt/GDP ratio 
of 37%, then one of the lowest among the euro area members. However, this apparently 
healthy state of affairs concealed a precarious situation owing to the presence of high tax 
revenue that had a significant temporary component tied to the major expansion of the 
construction and real estate sector, and to unsustainable spending dynamics. 
Indeed, the end of this expansion uncovered the risks latent in that situation. Almost half 
of the deterioration of more than 13 pp of GDP over only two years from 2007 to 2009 – a 
turnaround in public finances unprecedented in Spanish economic history – was due to 
the fall in revenue, largely associated with the disappearance of the aforementioned ex-
traordinary revenue. Meantime, public spending climbed significantly, largely as a result 
of the increase in unemployment benefits and in the interest burden, but also as a result 
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of spending on pensions and on government consumption. A further expression of the 
rapid deterioration in the deficit was the most substantial rise in public debt as a propor-
tion of GDP. 
The first conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis, and one which is very relevant 
for understanding our present difficulties, is that the budget deficit arising with the crisis 
was eminently structural. That is to say, it was not only due to the downward cycle, or to 
the temporary discretionary measures with no lasting effect on public finances. In any 
event, the outcome has been that the public debt/GDP ratio has not stopped growing 
since 2007, and we will end the current year 2012 with a level close to 85%: i.e. an in-
crease of almost 50 pp of GDP over a period of only five years, which in itself is an indica-
tor of the seriousness of our crisis. 
Reducing the budget deficit from its 2009 peak is proving anything but easy. Indeed, the 
correction made in 2010 and 2011 was very scant, and was of course less than that ini-
tially planned and desired. The budgetary adjustment is being made in highly adverse 
economic and financial circumstances, compounded by the impact in the short run of the 
austerity measures on economic activity. Moreover, stabilising the proportion of debt to 
GDP, which is a key figure for restoring market confidence, is all the more difficult against 
a backdrop of meagre growth or recession and of high interest rates on public debt. 
Yet these contractionary forces can be mitigated if credibility in the process of fiscal con-
solidation can be attained. From this standpoint, following the heavy slippage in the deficit 
in 2011, the target of 6.3% of GDP for this year and the fiscal adjustment path to which we 
have committed to 2014 should be the means by which the doubts of the European au-
thorities and the markets are dispelled. 
The information currently available (on central government figures to August) indicates that 
there are risks of slippage from the target set for 2012. Given the importance of achieving 
the target, additional measures under the Budgetary Stability Law should be considered 
that provide for the target to be met. I have some points to make in this connection. 
First, most of the slippage seen has originated from adverse developments in public rev-
enue, partly deriving from the very nature of the adjustment under way in the Spanish 
economy. The fact that, at present, the only source of improvement in economic activity is 
the external sector (neither higher exports nor lower imports generate, per se, increases in 
tax revenue) means that the prospect of buoyant public revenue is scant, and is com-
pounded by the intensity of the real estate adjustment. Against this background, maintain-
ing a prudent projection of public revenue is essential. 
Second, instruments are needed that enable early detection of potential slippage in reve-
nue and expenditure during the fiscal year. The new Stability Law demands significant 
improvements in the transparency of general government conduct, particularly in relation 
to the budget outturn figures for regional and local government, which should be released 
with the same periodicity, degree of detail, lag and ready accessibility as central govern-
ment data. 
Third, the mechanisms enabling the prompt correction of any potential slippage must be 
reinforced. Once again, the Stability Law includes new instruments, such as the auto-
matic adjustment of regional government spending in specific cases of non-compliance, 
the possibility of establishing sanctions and also of central government imposing adjust-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2012 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET COMMITTEE
ment measures. These new provisions may be effective in ensuring discipline, a matter 
that is all the more important following the extraordinary measures adopted by the State 
to offer liquidity support to regional and local government, such funds being conditional 
upon compliance with adjustment plans. 
And, fourth, the reinforcement of the credibility of the fiscal consolidation process takes on 
great importance in the current situation of the sovereign debt crisis. It may be of help here 
to establish a medium-term budgetary horizon providing sufficient details of the expected 
trend of public revenue and spending and the assumptions on which they are based, and 
on the contents of the planned measures and the expected effect they will have. That 
would all contribute to reducing economic agents’ uncertainty and would help identify the 
problems ahead in the medium term. 
In the fiscal consolidation process, the long-term perspective is fundamental. Over this 
horizon, it is well known that the biggest challenge to public finances stems from the pres-
sure that population ageing will exert on specific expenditure items, particularly pensions 
spending. Following the Social Security reform approved in July 2011, a specific definition 
is now needed of the so-called “sustainability factor”, which should result in an automatic 
adjustment of the system’s parameters if imbalances are detected in the long run. 
Before moving on to the Budget for 2013, I would like to specify the framework for debate 
of the draft legislation. 
Spain is a very decentralised country in terms of public spending, more so than certain 
countries with a federal political structure. Currently, almost half the consolidated public 
spending in Spain, i.e. net of transfers between general government sectors, is by re-
gional and local government. 
Based on figures for 2011, central government was responsible for only 22% of total pub-
lic spending; regional government for 34%; local government for 12%; and the Social 
Security system for 32%. That is to say, overall central government and social security 
spending in 2011 accounted for only 54% of the total, while that of regional and local gov-
ernment amounted to 46%. The picture given by the State and Social Security Budget is 
thus necessarily incomplete in respect of overall general government spending. 
Admittedly, prior to the presentation of the State Budget, Parliament and the Senate have 
approved the budget targets, both for overall general government and for each of its sub-
sectors, on the proposal of the Government and following a report by the Fiscal and Finan-
cial Policy Council and the Local Government National Board. Yet clearly the budgets of 
each regional government and each municipality are approved separately, there being no 
document containing information on all of them, together with that on the State and Social 
Security Budget. Hence, although we do have ex-post information that enables the public 
spending outcomes and outturn for the four major spending groups – central, regional and 
local government, and the Social Security system – to be analysed, we do not have an ex-
ante or prior document that provides a detailed analysis of budgetary projections for over-
all general government and its compatibility with the objectives set. 
It should be recalled, however, that the new Budgetary Stability Law introduced substan-
tial improvements in this respect. Specifically, it stipulates that, before 1 October each 
year, regional and local government shall submit information on the essential items con-
tained in their forthcoming budgets to the Ministry of Finance and General Government. 
The 2013 Budget 
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Then, before 15 October, the Ministry of Finance and General Government will release a 
report on the alignment of this budgetary information with the stability objectives, in such 
a way that the Ministry may make recommendations should it perceive slippage. And, fi-
nally, before 1 April the following year, the Minister of Finance and General Government 
has to submit a report to the Government on the degree of fulfilment by all tiers of govern-
ment of the objectives in the initial budget. I consider that these reports should in fact offer 
this complete picture of the budgetary projection that we are today lacking. 
I would further remind you that the Government has announced the creation in 2013 of 
an Independent Fiscal Authority to ensure compliance with budgetary regulations. This 
type of institution has proven useful in other developed countries in enhancing budget-
ary policy credibility. It is, however, crucial that such an institution should enjoy a de-
gree of independence, effective responsibilities and resources in line with best interna-
tional practices. 
I will now discuss the essential features of the State and Social Security budget for 2013. 
The draft State Budget for 2013 is part of a macroeconomic setting in which real GDP is 
estimated to decrease by 0.5% as a result of a negative rate of change in national demand 
of 2.8%, which would be partially offset by a 2.3 pp contribution from the external sector. 
This projection of a 0.5% decline in GDP in 2013 is clearly optimistic compared with the 
fall of around 1.5% currently projected by most international organisations and analysts. 
That said, I would like to make two observations. Firstly, if indeed the fall in activity in 2013 
is closer to 1.5% than 0.5%, the foreseeable impact on the deficit can be estimated at 
0.3 pp of GDP. This deviation is substantial, but it would be possible to correct it during the 
year. Secondly, all projections of changes in activity should be viewed with caution and 
with some distance. The history of forecasting errors and corrections to all manner of pro-
jections – including those of international institutions, large investment banks, government 
and, of course, the Banco de España – would fill many pages. In short, while considering 
that the rate of change in GDP for 2013 contained in the Budget is certainly optimistic, 
I would like to add that I do not think it is a serious difference or that it should detract cred-
ibility from the fiscal consolidation exercise undertaken in 2013. 
The Budget proposes an overall general government budget deficit target, in National Ac-
counts terms of 4.5% of GDP, down from 6.3% projected for 2012, excluding from this 
year the impact of the support measures for financial institutions. The target for 2013 is in 
line with our European commitments and will require a reduction in the primary deficit of 
almost 2.5 pp of GDP. 
In terms of the different agents, a deficit target, in National Accounts terms, of 3.8% of 
GDP is proposed for central government and the Social Security system, compared with a 
deficit of 4.5% of GDP projected in 2012, which would represent an improvement of 0.7 pp 
of GDP, similar to that projected for the regional governments, which should reduce their 
deficit from 1.5% in 2012 to 0.7% in 2013. The adjustment would be completed with the 
projected reduction of 0.3 pp in local government to reach a balanced budget in 2013. 
On the revenue side, this budget tightens the fiscal pressure both in terms of direct and 
indirect taxation, with a range of new measures. Furthermore, it should be recalled that, in 
2013, the measures approved in 2012 in relation to higher personal income tax rates, the 
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increase in the rate on income from fee-earning activities, changes to corporate income 
tax and the rise in VAT rates will still have a significant impact.
Despite the background of recession, the tax take is projected to increase overall by 3.7%. 
The net effect of all the tax regulation measures with an impact in 2013 is estimated to be 
approximately €7.2 billion. Net of this impact, revenue would fall by 0.5%. 
As for the Social Security Budget, the 1 pp reduction planned last July is postponed or 
ruled out, and a 1.1% fall is projected in 2013 in total social security contributions com-
pared with the initial budget for 2012. 
The projected tax revenue for 2013 is subject to downside risks because it is based on the 
assumption that the revenue targets for 2012 will be achieved. However, on the information 
currently available, it cannot be ruled out that revenue performs worse than expected in 2012. 
If this risk materialises and is not countered by appropriate action in the remainder of the year, 
that would make it difficult to achieve the targets set for 2013, compounding the possible ef-
fects of a bigger decline in GDP than that assumed in the budgetary programming. 
On the expenditure side, the weight of three items should first be underlined: Social Secu-
rity system contributory pensions, unemployment benefits and the interest on government 
debt. In 2012, these three items are equivalent to 20% of GDP and will account for ap-
proximately 36% of total public spending. In 2013, these percentages will foreseeably in-
crease significantly. 
Noteworthy among the measures considered on the expenditure side are: the freezing of 
civil servants’ and public-sector employees’ salaries (albeit with the recovery of their Decem-
ber extra payroll) which, together with not filling vacancies, will result in a very low increase in 
personnel costs in relation to serving employees of around 0.1%. Real investments are re-
duced by 46%, whereas the interest burden increases by more than €12 billion. 
In the Social Security system, spending on contributory pensions, sickness and other 
benefits will grow by slightly more than 5%, factoring in the raising of pensions by 1%. 
Foreseeably, however, spending on unemployment benefits will fall by slightly more than 
6% due to the projected stability in unemployment figures and to regulatory amendments 
to the benefits system. Note, however, that changes in expenditure on social security pen-
sions in 2013 will be affected by the revision that should be made, taking into account the 
inflation rate recorded to November 2012. Since an increase of 3.5% is projected and the 
corresponding adjustment payment could be around 2.5%, that would represent an in-
crease in spending of approximately €3 billion in 2012, which would be consolidated in 
2013 and in future years. 
I should mention that, in the next budget, one of the most important agreements of the 
so-called Toledo Pact will finally be concluded, in connection with the separation of the 
system’s sources of financing: on one hand, contributory pensions will be financed exclu-
sively by contributions; and, on the other, the non-contributory top-ups and non-contribu-
tory pensions will be financed by taxes. This separation, which began to be applied in 
2002, will be completed in 2013: and this is good news for the proper functioning of the 
system as a whole and for its future. 
As I indicated above, from the beginning of the crisis in 2007 until the end of 2012, the ratio 
of our public debt – as defined in the Excessive Deficit Protocol – to GDP has increased by 
Expenditure 
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50 pp. Undoubtedly, this is the highest increase over the shortest period in this ratio in 
Spain’s economic history. The increase from 2011 to 2012 will amount to 16 pp of GDP, of 
which: 7 pp are explained by the deficit (4 pp by the primary balance and 3 pp by interest); 
nearly 1 pp is due to the fall in nominal GDP nominal, and 8 pp are attributable, essentially, 
to the financing of the Plan to Pay Suppliers and €30 billion of the amount estimated by the 
FROB to be drawn down from the European Financial Facility before year-end. 
This ratio is projected to grow more moderately in 2013, from 85% to 91% of GDP, i.e. an 
increase of 6 pp compared with the 16 pp we will record in 2012, and will be almost exclu-
sively due to the increase in the interest burden on public debt because, if the projections 
are fulfilled, the primary deficit will be 0.7% of GDP in 2013. 
I would not like to conclude without commenting, albeit very briefly, on the programme for 
the clean-up and restructuring of our banking system. 
As you know, a further step has been taken with the publication of the estimates of capital 
needs, based on the stress tests performed by an independent appraiser, supported by 
audit firms and real estate appraisal companies under the supervision of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and with the 
participation of the Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Banco de España. 
I will not repeat here the figures already published and explained and which were yester-
day commented on by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Competitiveness before the 
Economic Affairs Committee. 
However, I do want to say that the exercise performed is unprecedented in terms of its 
depth and detail, the severity of the macroeconomic assumptions accepted and the 
scrutiny to which it was subject throughout by experts from the institutions I have men-
tioned above. 
But there is still some way to go in the clean-up and restructuring of our banking system. 
The Memorandum of Understanding signed last July sets out the steps now to be taken, 
which the Spanish authorities – and, rest assured, the Banco de España – will comply with 
as precisely as possible. 
The restructuring or resolution plans for banks owned by the FROB must be approved 
before December 2012. Also, before November, we shall have at our disposal the recapi-
talisation plans of banks which cannot meet their capital shortfall without State aid, on the 
understanding that banks which are not considered viable will be resolved orderly in ac-
cordance with the terms of the corresponding resolution plan. Banks that can meet their 
capital shortfall without resorting to State aid will be required to implement their recapi-
talisation plans before June 2013. 
The other key component of the clean-up programme is the Asset Management Company 
which should be operational at the beginning of 2013. It is key because it will permit the 
clean-up of the banks requiring State aid to be completed and will provide a suitable hori-
zon for the management and sale of the mass of assets to be transferred. 
The Budget for 2013 involves a considerable drive in respect of fiscal adjustment. It at-
tempts to bring about a correction in the primary deficit, net of interest on public debt of 
almost 2.5 pp of GDP. In the depth of a recession, that is very difficult, but necessary in 
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order to meet the targets to which Spain is committed within the framework of the Euro-
pean Union and the euro area. 
We have some data which, although not warranting excessive optimism, do indicate that 
an adjustment is being achieved. We are going to end 2012 with a current account almost 
in balance, and in 2013 it will probably run a surplus. The recession has a contributing fac-
tor, but not the only one. We also have a clear improvement in competitiveness based on 
changes in our labour costs and in productivity. 
The most pressing problem facing the Spanish economy is to restore market confidence. 
There is no other way to achieve this than meeting the fiscal consolidation targets, com-
pleting the clean-up and restructuring of our banking system, continuing with the process 
of private and public deleveraging and moving ahead with the reforms undertaken to im-
prove our competitiveness. 
If we manage to make progress on those fronts in 2013, I am confident it will be possible 
to resume economic growth and to create net employment in 2014.
4.10.2012
